Secure Distributed On-Device Learning Networks With Byzantine
  Adversaries by Dong, Yanjie et al.
1Secure Distributed On-Device Learning Networks With
Byzantine Adversaries
Yanjie Dong, Student Member, IEEE, Julian Cheng, Senior Member, IEEE,
Md. Jahangir Hossain, Senior Member, IEEE, and Victor C. M. Leung, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract
The privacy concern exists when the central server has the copies of datasets. Hence, there is a
paradigm shift for the learning networks to change from centralized in-cloud learning to distributed
on-device learning. Benefit from the parallel computing, the on-device learning networks have a lower
bandwidth requirement than the in-cloud learning networks. Moreover, the on-device learning networks
also have several desirable characteristics such as privacy preserving and flexibility. However, the
on-device learning networks are vulnerable to the malfunctioning terminals across the networks. The
worst-case malfunctioning terminals are the Byzantine adversaries, that can perform arbitrary harmful
operations to compromise the learned model based on the full knowledge of the networks. Hence, the
design of secure learning algorithms becomes an emerging topic in the on-device learning networks
with Byzantine adversaries. In this article, we present a comprehensive overview of the prevalent
secure learning algorithms for the two promising on-device learning networks: Federated-Learning
networks and decentralized-learning networks. We also review several future research directions in
the Federated-Learning and decentralized-learning networks.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the big data era, the high volume of datasets will improve the accuracy of learning networks.
However, the ever-increasing dimension of data samples and the size of datasets introduce new
challenges to the centralized in-cloud learning networks. For example, the in-cloud learning
networks will experience accuracy degradation since the limited bandwidth in current networking
infrastructure may not satisfy the demands for transmitting the high-volume datasets to the central
cloud [1]. The central cloud and terminals have the copies of datasets. Hence, there is a privacy
concern as long as either the terminals or central cloud is hacked by malfunctioning users, e.g.,
the unexpected leakage of photos of celebrities from iCloud in 20141.
The soaring demands on bandwidth and privacy concerns cause a shift of research focus
from the centralized in-cloud learning networks to the distributed on-device learning networks.
Moreover, the on-device learning networks also benefit from the improvement of storage volume
and computational power of mobile terminals. The objective of on-device learning networks is
to obtain the optimal model parameter, which provides an optimal mapping between the data
samples and labels of a dataset. For example, the optimal model parameter is used to map bits
of an image to the number in the image in the MNIST dataset2.
Among the on-device learning networks, the Federated-Learning networks (FLNs) [1] and
decentralized-learning networks (DLNs) [2] are the two categories of promising candidates as
shown in Figs. 1(a) and 1(b), respectively. As an on-device learning network recently proposed
by Google, the FLN consists of a parameter server and multiple terminals as shown in Fig.
1(a). In the FLNs, the terminals perform the distributed parallel computation based on the local
datasets. The parameter server updates the model parameter based on the results of the terminals.
Due to the parallel computing, the FLNs converge as fast as the centralized counterpart: the
in-cloud learning networks. When the parameter server experiences unprecedented outage3, the
DLN becomes a promising on-device learning network since the DLN does not require a central
parameter server [2]. In the DLNs, the terminals need to communicate with the neighbors to
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ICloud leaks of celebrity photos
2http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/
3The outage events include the energy outage at the location of server, the hardware failure of server, etc.
3exchange the distributed training results. Hereinafter, two terminals are neighbors when they have
one-hop connection with each other. For example, the first and the second terminals are neighbors
to each other in Fig. 1(b). When each terminal is the neighbor of the remaining terminals, the
DLN is called fully-connected; otherwise, it is called partially-connected. The advantages and
disadvantages of in-cloud learning networks and on-device learning networks are summarized
in the table of Fig. 1(c).
Terminal 1 Terminal 2 Terminal K
. . .
Parameter Server
(a) A typical FLN with K terminals.
Terminal 1
Terminal 2 Terminal 3
Terminal 5
Terminal 4
(b) A typical DLN with five terminals.
Network Setup In-Could Learning Networks FLNs and DLNs
Advantages
1. No redundant exchange of 
datasets
1. Low privacy concern
2. Flexibility of joining and 
leaving for terminals
3. Low bandwidth demand
Disadvantages
1. Privacy concern of 
information leakage
2. High bandwidth demand
1. Redundant exchange of 
model parameter
2. Secrecy concern over 
malfunctioning terminals
(c) Comparisons of in-cloud learning networks with FLNs and DLNs.
Fig. 1: An illustration of FLNs and DLNs, and the comparisons with in-cloud learning networks.
The FLNs and DLNs have several desirable characteristics. For example, the datasets are kept
at the terminals such that the FLNs and DLNs do not have multiple copies of the privacy-related
datasets. Hence, the probability of privacy leakage is reduced. Another desirable characteristic
is that the terminals are flexible to join and leave the FLNs (or DLNs). In order to achieve these
desirable characteristics, several challenges need to be solved such as the uneven distribution
of training datasets, redundant exchanging of model parameter and secrecy over malfunctioning
terminals [1], [3], [4]. Among these challenges, the secrecy over malfunctioning terminals is the
4most important one since failure in preserving secrecy degrades the accuracy of FLNs and DLNs.
However, the current literature on the FLNs (or DLNs) mostly assume that the terminals can
reliably upload (or exchange) the local results to the parameter server (or neighbors). Therefore,
they cannot be used to secure the FLNs and DLNs over malfunctioning terminals (see [1], [3],
[4] and references therein).
Several recent research works [3]–[11] have reported that secure learning algorithms can
be used to protect the security of FLNs and DLNs with multiple Byzantine adversaries. In
the FLNs and DLNs, the Byzantine adversaries are the malfunctioning terminals, that can 1)
obtain the full malicious action space based on the full knowledge of the networks; and 2)
choose arbitrarily bad action from the full malicious action space to compromise the prediction
accuracy of the networks [12]. Since the action space of any other malfunctioning terminals is
a subset of the full malicious action space, the Byzantine adversaries are considered as the
worst-case malfunctioning terminals. When a learning algorithm preserves secrecy over the
Byzantine adversaries, it is robust to the full malicious action space of the networks. Thus,
the learning algorithm is robust to any other malfunctioning terminals. Hereinafter, we focus on
reviewing the state-of-the-art research progresses on secure learning algorithms in the FLNs and
DLNs with Byzantine adversaries. Our contributions are summarized as follows.
• In the FLNs with Byzantine adversaries, we classify the current secure Federated-Learning
algorithms (SFLAs) into four categories: 1) aggregation rule based SFLAs; 2) preprocess
based SFLAs; 3) model based SFLAs; and 4) adversarial detection based SFLAs. We also
provide qualitative comparisons of current SFLAs.
• Since the design of secure decentralized-learning algorithms (SDLAs) is at the early stage,
few works investigated the SDLAs. Therefore, we review several exemplary works on
SDLAs.
• We discuss several future research directions for secure learning algorithms in the FLNs
and DLNs with Byzantine adversaries.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first comprehensive overview on the secure
learning algorithms in the on-device learning networks with Byzantine adversaries.
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Parameter Server
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Reliable Byzantine
(a) The (Q+ 1)-th to the K-th terminals are
Byzantine adversaries.
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Update Model
(b) The implementation procedures of a typical SFLA with
Byzantine adversaries.
Fig. 2: General setup of FLNs and SFLAs.
II. ON-DEVICE LEARNING NETWORKS WITH BYZANTINE ADVERSARIES: BASICS
A. Functions of Devices in the On-Device Learning Networks
In the on-device learning networks with Byzantine adversaries, secure learning algorithms
have two objectives: convergence and optimality [3]–[6]. In order to achieve both goals, the
following functions need to be implemented at different devices of the FLNs and DLNs.
• Parameter server: In the FLNs, the updating and broadcasting of model parameter are
performed at the parameter server.
• Reliable terminals: In the FLNs, the terminals upload the local gradients to the parameter
server [3]–[9]. In the DLNs, the terminals exchange the local model parameter with the
neighbors [10], [11].
• Byzantine adversaries: In the FLNs and DLNs, the Byzantine adversaries perform arbitrar-
ily bad actions. Different Byzantine adversaries can collude to compromise the prediction
accuracy of learning algorithms [3], [4], [6].
B. Description of Federated-Learning Networks
We consider an FLN with a parameter server and K terminals, where the first Q terminals are
reliable and the remaining K−Q terminals are Byzantine adversaries as shown in Fig. 2(a). Let
zk denote the randomly-distributed data at the k-th terminal. The distribution of zk is unknown,
and the distributions of data at different terminals can be different. Let fˆk(w) = Ezk [f(w; zk)]
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(b) The implementation procedures of a typical SDLA with
Byzantine adversaries.
Fig. 3: General setup of DLNs and SDLAs.
denote the average loss function with respect to the model parameter w at the k-th terminal.
Here, the loss function f(w; zk) quantifies the prediction accuracy associated with the model
parameter w at the k-th terminal. Leveraging the parallel computation of terminals, SFLAs in
the FLN can obtain the optimal model parameter w∗ that minimizes the sum-of-average-loss-
function (SoALF)
∑K
k=1 fˆk(w) without impairment of K −Q Byzantine adversaries.
The detailed procedures of a typical SFLA in the FLN with Byzantine adversaries are shown
in Fig. 2(b). At the beginning of (τ + 1)-th slot, the parameter server broadcasts the global
model parameter wτ to all the K terminals. After receiving the model parameter wτ , the reliable
terminals calculate the local gradient of average loss function ∇fˆk(wτ ) based on the data sample
(or mini-batch of samples4) zτk . The Byzantine adversaries generate harmful local gradients.
Then, the terminals synchronously upload the local gradients to the parameter server. At last,
the parameter server obtains a global gradient via the aggregation rule. Here, an aggregation rule
defines a method for the parameter server to obtain the global gradient based on the uploaded
local gradients. Using the global gradient, the parameter server updates the model parameter for
the next iteration until the convergence of SoALF.
7C. Description of Decentralized-Learning Networks
We consider a DLN with K = 5 terminals. As shown in Fig. 3(a), the second and the fourth
terminals are Byzantine adversaries among the five terminals. The first, the third and the fifth
terminals are reliable terminals (i.e., Q = 2). Different from the FLNs, the terminals in the
DLN obtain the optimal model parameter w∗ that minimizes the SoALF as
∑5
k=1 fˆk(w) in a
decentralized way. During the operation of SDLA, each terminal exchanges the local model
parameter with the neighbor terminals. We take the third terminal as an example, and present
the detailed procedures of a typical SDLA in the DLN with Byzantine adversaries as shown in
Fig. 3(b).
At the start of the (τ + 1)-th slot, the third reliable terminal computes the value of the third
average loss function fˆ3(wτ3) based on the local model parameter w
τ
3 . Then, the third reliable
terminal updates the local model parameter and obtain wτ+13 . Finally, the third reliable terminal
broadcasts the local model parameter wτ+13 to the neighbor terminals, e.g., the second, the
fourth and the fifth terminals. The Byzantine adversaries broadcast arbitrary adversarial model
parameter to their neighbor terminals. All terminals repeat the above process until the SoALF
converges.
D. Stochastic Gradient, Batch Gradient and Mini-Batch Gradient
Since the distribution of data zk is unknown, it is challenging to obtain the exact local gradient
∇fˆk(w) due to the high-dimensional integration over the unknown data zk. Therefore, several
estimators of local gradient are obtained based on the ways to use data samples of terminals. The
batch gradient is obtained as∇fˆk(wτ ) ≈ 1|zτk |
∑|zτk |
i=1 ∇f
(
wτ ; zτki
)
where |zτk | and zτki respectively
denote the size of data samples and the i-th data sample of the k-th terminal at the beginning of
(τ + 1)-th slot. Since the batch gradient needs to evaluate the gradient of loss function over all
data samples at the k-th terminal, the computational cost at the k-th terminals increases as the
size of data samples. By sacrificing the convergence rate, the computational cost can be reduced
via the stochastic gradient. The stochastic gradient is obtained by calculating the gradient of
loss function over one randomly-drawn data sample as ∇fˆk(wτ ) ≈ ∇f
(
wτ ; zτki
)
. In order to
balance the computational cost and convergence rate, the mini-batch gradient can be used by
4Mini-batch of samples is a subset of data samples in a dataset.
8evaluating the gradient of loss function over a mini-batch data samples at the k-th terminal as
∇fˆk(wτ ) ≈ 1L
∑L
i=1∇f
(
wτ ; zτki
)
with L as the size of mini-batch data samples.
III. PREVALENT SECURE DISTRIBUTED LEARNING ALGORITHMS
A. Aggregation Rule Based Algorithms
Aggregation of gradients is the important step for an SFLA in the FLNs with Byzantine
adversaries. In their seminal work [3], Blanchard et al. reported that the mean-value aggregation
rule outputs a sequence of global gradients that can be arbitrarily biased by one Byzantine
adversary. Hence, the learning algorithms with mean-value aggregation rule do not converge
or converge to an ineffective model parameter. When the fraction of Byzantine adversaries is
less than 50%, Blanchard et al. proposed a secure aggregation rule named as Krum [3]. The
objective of Krum is to approximate the optimal global gradient, which is defined as the average
of local gradients when no Byzantine adversary exists. In each iteration, Krum selects one of
the local gradients as the global gradient. Since selected global gradient has the smallest sum
Euclidean distance to its first Q − 2 closest local gradients, the Euclidean distance between
the selected global gradient and optimal global gradient is bounded. Therefore, the impact of
Byzantine adversaries is mitigated. Moreover, Blanchard et al. also demonstrated that the selected
sequence of global gradients almost-surely converges [3].
Compared with the mean value of a sequence, the median gives a reliable estimation when
more than half of the sequence is correct. Hence, several aggregation rules are proposed based
on the variants of median [4], [5]. For the multi-dimensional local gradients, Chen et al. defined
a geometric median (GeoMed) as the minimizer of the sum distances to all local gradients [4].
With the GeoMed, the parameter server outputs a global gradient that secures the distributed
learning algorithms. When the convex SoALF is used, Chen et al. proved that the SFLAs with
GeoMed aggregation rule are Byzantine-robust when the number of Byzantine adversaries is less
than the number of reliable terminals [4]. In addition, Chen et al. also quantified the convergence
rate of each iteration [4].
When the fraction of Byzantine adversaries is less than 50%, Yin et al. proposed two aggrega-
tion rules [5]: component-wise median (CwMed) and component-wise trimmed mean (CwTM).
The CwMed constructs a global gradient, where each entry is the median of entries in the local
gradients with the same coordinate [5, Def. 1]. With CwMed, each entry of global gradient is not
polluted by the Byzantine adversaries. Different from CwMed, the CwTM first component-wisely
9removes the largest and smallest fraction of entries in the local gradients [5, Def. 2]. Then, the
CwTM constructs a global gradient, where each entry is the mean value of remaining entries of
local gradients. The CwTM needs to know the number of Byzantine adversaries such that the
fault entries of Byzantine adversaries are removed with high probability. Yin et al. also quantified
the convergence rate of SFLAs with CwMed or CwTM aggregation rules for strongly convex,
non-strongly convex and smooth non-convex SoALFs [5].
Since the GeoMed aggregation rule requires solving an convex optimization to obtain the
global gradients, the computational complexity exponentially increases with the dimension of
model parameter. Since Krum, CwMed and CwTM only include linear algebraic operations to
obtain the model parameter, these three aggregation rules have lower computational complexity
than GeoMed.
B. Preprocessing Based Algorithms
In addition to the aggregation rule, several preprocessing methods utilizing the local gradients
are investigated to design the SFLAs [6], [7]. For example, Chen et al. proposed a preprocess
based SFLA [6], known as DRACO, in the FLNs. DRACO leverages the coding theory to
remove the negative effect (i.e., degradation of prediction accuracy) of Byzantine adversaries.
From the information-theoretical perspective, the optimal gradient can be recovered when the
reliable terminals report sufficient information to the parameter server. Specifically, Chen et
al. demonstrated that DRACO secures the learning algorithms when the number of Byzantine
adversaries is less than half of the average number of gradients based on a data sample (i.e.,
redundancy ratio is higher than 50%) [6]. Moreover, the authors illustrated two practical coding
schemes to implement DRACO. Since DRACO secures the learning algorithms via redundant
storage of data samples, DRACO does not impose limitation on the fraction of Byzantine
adversaries and can secure the traditional learning algorithms. Besides, the convergence behavior
of DRACO highly depends on the used learning procedures.
El Mhamdi et al. proposed a preprocess method [7]: Bulyan. Bulyan uses Krum [3] to obtain
a subset of uploaded local gradients. The parameter server constructs a global gradient by taking
the component-wise average to the refined subset of local gradients. We observe that Bulyan
introduces extra linear operations to Krum. Hence, Bulyan converges when the convex and
non-convex SoALFs are used. Bulyan guarantees that the prediction accuracy is not affected
by the dimension of data samples. Since Bulyan is a refinement of Krum by removing several
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unnecessary local gradients, it has a more strict limitation on the number of Byzantine adversaries.
More specifically, the number of Byzantine adversaries is less than 25% of the number of
terminals in the FLNs.
C. Model Based Algorithms
The SFLAs can be designed during the formulation of problem model in the FLNs. Li et
al. proposed a problem model based SFLA [8], which is named as Byzantine-robust stochastic
aggregation (BRSA) algorithm. In the BRSA algorithm, a regularization term is introduced to
the SoALF such that the uploaded local gradients of reliable terminals and Byzantine adversaries
are discretized into finite set. Using the discrete local gradients, the BRSA algorithm converges
to a suboptimal model parameter. Since the problem model used by BRSA is secured, the BRSA
algorithm converges without the limitation on the fraction of Byzantine adversaries [8]. For the
convex SoALF, Li et al. quantitatively analyzed the relation between the accuracy of BRSA
algorithm and the number of Byzantine adversaries [8]. Selecting different regularization terms,
the convergence rate can be traded for the reduction of gap between the optimal model parameter
and convergent model parameter. Besides, the BRSA algorithm allows that the data samples at
different terminals to have different distributions.
D. Adversarial Detection Based Algorithms
While the previous works mainly focused on designing Byzantine-resilient learning algorithms,
an extra step to detect Byzantine adversaries has been included before the aggregation of local
gradients. When the SoALF is convex and the number of Byzantine adversaries is less than that
of reliable terminals, Alistarh et al. proposed the Byzantine stochastic gradient descent (SGD)
algorithm to detect the Byzantine adversaries [9]. The motivation of this two-threshold approach
is based on the facts that the reliable terminals can introduce: 1) limited variation of time-average
local gradients, and 2) limited fluctuation for the time-average inner products of local gradient and
variation of model parameter. When either one of the facts is violated, the terminal is detected as a
Byzantine adversary. For a Byzantine adversary without violating the two thresholds, Alistarh et
al. demonstrated that the Byzantine adversary cannot compromise the convergence and accuracy
of Byzantine SGD algorithm [9]. Based on the detection of Byzantine adversaries, the number
of local gradients is reduced to one such that the computational complexity at the terminals
is reduced. Through theoretical analysis, the proposed detection method achieves the optimal
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number of gradient exchange between the parameter server and the terminals [9, Theorems 3.4
and 3.5].
E. Qualitative Comparisons
While GeoMed, Byzantine SGD and BRSA are effective for the convex loss functions, Krum,
CwTM, CwMed, Bulyan and DRACO work for both convex and non-convex loss functions. Since
the Bulyan is a refinement of Krum, it has more strict limitations than Krum on the number of
Byzantine adversaries. Table I presents a coarse-grained comparison among the state-of-the-art
SFLAs. Note that the complexity in Table I indicates the computational complexity to obtain
the global gradient at the parameter. The computational complexity scales with the number of
Byzantine adversaries, the dimensions of model parameter, and the number of terminals.
TABLE I: Coarse-Grained Comparison of SFLAs
Scheme Loss Function % of Byzantine Adversaries Sample Redundancy Complexity
Krum [3] Convex, non-convex < 50% × Medium
GeoMed [4] Convex < 50% × High
CwTM [5] Convex, non-convex < 50% × Low∼Medium
CwMed [5] Convex, non-convex < 50% × Low∼Medium
BRSA [8] Convex N/A × Low
Bulyan [6] Convex, non-convex < 25% × Medium∼High
DRACO [7] Convex, non-convex N/A X Low
Byzantine SGD [9] Convex < 50% × Low
F. A Case Study
The loss function takes the form of the regularized softmax regression. We consider there are
10 terminals, among which there are two Byzantine adversaries. All the results are run over
MNIST dataset with 60, 000 training samples and 10, 000 test samples. We consider two types
of attacks: 1) reverse attacks; and 2) Gaussian attacks. In the reverse attacks, the Byzantine
adversaries upload the scaled local gradients scaled by a negative value (e.g., −100 in our
simulations) to the parameter server. In the Gaussian attacks, the Byzantine adversaries upload
local gradients where each entry follows a Gaussian distribution with mean zero and Gaussian
distributed variance. The variance of the inner Gaussian distribution is set as 100. The model
parameter is updated by a mini-batch SGD method with mini-batch size of 40. Hereinafter, the
simulations are run for 5, 000 iterations with the learning rate 0.1/
√
Iteration.
12
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(a) Classical learning algorithm without attack.
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(b) Classical learning algorithm under reverse attacks.
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(c) Classical learning algorithm under Gaussian attacks.
Fig. 4: An illustration of the impact of Byzantine adversaries on the prediction accuracy. The
title of each image shows the predicted value of the image, and the incorrect predicted values
are highlighted.
Figures 4(a)-4(c) illustrate that the Byzantine adversaries can compromise the prediction
accuracy of the classical learning algorithms. As shown in Fig. 4(a), the model parameter
obtained by the classical learning algorithms return two errors. When the Byzantine adversaries
are included (e.g., reverse attacks in Fig. 4(b) and Gaussian attacks in Fig. 4(c)), the prediction
accuracy of the classical learning algorithms is significantly compromised.
Figures 5(a) and 5(b) show the accuracy of the four aggregation rules: 1) Krum [3], 2) GeoMed
[4], 3) CwMed [5] and 4) CwTM [5]. The benchmark scheme is a classical learning algorithm
where model parameter is updated by mini-batch SGD method. All terminals are reliable in
13
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(b) Convergence of SFLAs with Gaussian attacks.
Fig. 5: Convergence behaviors of SFLAs under different attacks.
the benchmark scheme. The Krum algorithm, GeoMed algorithm and CwTM algorithm perform
similarly when the reverse attacks are present. When there are Gaussian attacks, the GeoMed
algorithm can obtain a near-optimal model parameter and outperforms the remaining aggregation
rules. However, the GeoMed algorithm requires the parameter server to solve an optimization
problem to update the model parameter during each iteration. The Krum algorithm, CwMed
algorithm and CwTM algorithm rely on the simple algebraic manipulations; therefore, the Krum
algorithm, CwMed algorithm and CwTM algorithm have lower computational complexities than
the GeoMed algorithm. Hence, we conclude that different aggregation rules provide different
tradeoff between the accuracy and the computational complexity.
IV. PREVALENT SECURE DECENTRALIZED LEARNING ALGORITHMS
Before proceeding to discuss the SDLAs, we first define the trim operation used in DLNs with
K−Q Byzantine adversaries. Performing trim operation to a sequence of scalar values means that
the largest K−Q and the smallest K−Q values are removed from the sequence. In this section,
we present two exemplary works for fully-connected DLNs [10] and partially-connected DLNs
[11] with a scalar model parameter. In the DLNs, each terminal needs to converge to the same
local model parameter, i.e., consensus model parameter. However, the Byzantine adversaries can
broadcast different fake model parameters to their neighbors such that the convergent model
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parameter is biased from the consensus model parameter. Moreover, the prediction accuracy of
the convergent model parameter is significantly degraded.
In the proposed SDLA for fully-connected DLNs, each terminal exchanges local model
parameter and local gradient with the neighbors [10]. Different from [10], the SDLA for partially-
connected DLNs [11] only requires each terminal to exchange the local gradient with the
neighbors. Therefore, each terminal maintains a local-gradient sequence [11] (or a local-model-
parameter sequence and a local-gradient sequence [10]). In each iteration, each terminal performs
the trim operation to the local-gradient sequence [11] (or the local-model-parameter sequence
and local-gradient sequence [10]). Then, each terminal updates the model parameter based on the
local-gradient sequence [11] (or the local-model-parameter sequence and local-gradient sequence
[10]).
In order to obtain the consensus model parameter, the fully-connected DLNs requires that the
reliable terminals are twice larger in number than the Byzantine adversaries. For the partially-
connected DLNs, the requirements differ from the connectivity of the terminals. When there are
K − Q Byzantine adversaries in the DLNs, the consensus-based SDLA converges if and only
if the partially connected DLNs are (K −Q+ 1, K −Q+ 1)-robust [11]. When each terminal
has at most K−Q Byzantine-adversary neighbors, the consensus-based SDLA converges to the
consensual model parameter given the (2K − 2Q+ 1)-robust DLNs [11].
V. FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
A. Bandwidth Reduction of SFLAs
In the FLNs, the frequent uploads of gradients from terminals to parameter server become
inevitable for the SFLAs. With the high-dimensional gradients and large number of iterations, the
bandwidth demand is still high during the learning process of the FLNs. In order to reduce the
bandwidth demand, Chen et al. proposed a lazily-aggregated gradient method where the terminals
can adaptively skip the gradient calculation and gradient-exchanging [13]. Moreover, the authors
also theoretically demonstrated that the lazily-aggregated gradient method has the same conver-
gence rate and less communication complexity than the batch gradient descent method. However,
the convergence and optimality of the lazily-aggregated gradient method are unknown when
multiple Byzantine adversaries exist in the FLNs. The state-of-the-art SFLAs require terminals
to upload local gradients in each iteration. The communication complexity becomes a major
obstacle to scale up the SFLAs in the FLNs. In order to reduce the computational complexity of
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SFLAs, one promising method is to exclude the redundant exchanged gradients of the reliable
terminals. Besides, compressing the exchanged gradients per iteration alleviates the scarcity
of bandwidth. In order to compensate the loss during compression, the SFLAs with gradient
compression also need to include methods such as momentum correction and local gradient
clipping.
B. Multi-Task SFLAs
While the current learning algorithms mainly focus on obtaining a single global model, it
is attractive to concurrently compute multiple models when these models are correlated. The
correlation can be induced by similar behaviors of different terminals, such as reposting the
similar news in the social media and watching the popular video episodes over internet. Moreover,
the parallel computation of multiple models introduces several benefits such as learning efficiency
and prediction accuracy. Therefore, the multi-task learning algorithms are proposed for the FLNs
[14]. In the presence of Byzantine adversaries, one potential research direction is to investigate
the secure multi-task learning algorithms (SMTLAs) in the FLNs. The SMTLAs need to converge
to a near-optimal model parameter without being falsified by Byzantine adversaries, and also
need to preserve the communication expenditure as minimal as possible. The SMTLAs can be
developed based on the aforementioned aggregation rules and regularization term. However, the
convergence property and communication expenditure remain agnostic when the aggregation
rules and regularization term are used. Moreover, introducing a precoding process for the update
of gradients can also secure the multi-task learning algorithms in the FLNs.
C. Stochastic SDLAs
Since the data samples are locally collected at each terminal in the DLNs, each terminal
may have a similar model parameter to its neighbors but retain a small difference [15]. As
pointed by Koppel et al. in [15], the proximity constraints among the neighboring terminals are
a promising technique to formulate such small differences in the DLNs. In order to avoid multiple
assessments of average loss functions, the stochastic saddle point algorithm was introduced by
allowing each terminal to access its local loss function once in each iteration [15]. However,
the convergence and optimality of stochastic saddle point algorithm can be compromised by the
multiple Byzantine adversaries in the DLNs. While the proposed algorithms in [10], [11] are
secure to DLNs with Byzantine adversaries and the scalar model parameter, it is more practical
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to learn a high-dimensional model parameters due to the ever-increasing volume of datasets. The
regularization term used in [8] is promising to handle the Byzantine adversaries in the FLNs,
it remains an open problem to design the regularized term in the DLNs with the Byzantine
adversaries. When the heterogeneity of data samples is considered, the design of multi-task
SDLAs is also an interesting research problem in the DLNs.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Since the current learning algorithms are vulnerable to the Byzantine adversaries, we provided
a comprehensive overview of the SFLAs and SDLAs in the FLNs and DLNs, respectively.
The Byzantine adversaries are considered since the Byzantine adversaries can act arbitrarily to
compromise the classical learning algorithms. Therefore, the secure learning algorithms, which
are robust over the Byzantine adversaries, can work under any attacks from the terminals. We
presented the signaling-exchange procedures of the secure learning algorithms in both FLNs and
DLNs when Byzantine adversaries coexist with the reliable terminals. Numerous state-of-the-art
secure learning algorithms were discussed in terms of the main contributions in the FLNs and
DLNs. Several future research directions were discussed for the secure learning algorithms in
the FLNs and DLNs.
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